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SUFFICIENCY OF DEFINITION OF CRIMES
Even the most elaborately drafted statute cannot always
fully illuminate the details of proscribed criminal conduct. In
State v. Lindsey' the Louisiana Supreme Court once again
approved the sound and practical principle that general lan-
guage, as distinguished from detailed specification of the var-
ious forms which the proscribed criminal conduct may take,
may provide a constitutionally sound definition of a crime. In
Lindsey the court upheld the definition of crime against na-
ture,2 rejecting defense counsel's claim that the statutory
language was unconstitutionally vague. Quoting from State v.
Bonanno,3 Justice Marcus stated:
The phrase "unnatural carnal copulation" that counsel
points to in particular as being of obscure, vague and
indefinite meaning, consists of words of common usage
and indicate (sic) with reasonable clarity the kind and
character of conduct the legislature intended to prohibit
and punish .... To meet the test of constitutionality it is
not necessary that the statute describe the loathsome
and disgusting details connected with each and every way
in which "unnatural carnal copulation" may be accom-
plished.4
Similarly, in State v. Heck5 the court upheld the disturb-
ing the peace article of the Criminal Code,6 stressing that due
process "does not invariably require a detailed specification of
the various ways in which the crime can be committed," 7 and
that a generally phrased statute will be upheld "if the
phraseology has a well known or commonly understood mean-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 310 So. 2d 89 (La. 1975).
2. LA. R.S. 14:89 (1950).
3. 245 La. 1117, 163 So. 2d 72 (1964).
4. 310 So. 2d at 91.
5. 307 So. 2d 332 (La. 1975).
6. LA. R.S. 14:103 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 70, § 1; La.
Acts 1963, No. 93, § 1; La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1, Emerg. eff. July 20, 1968, at
1:30 P.M.
7. 307 So. 2d at 333.
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ing."8 Chief Justice Sanders concluded that the phrase "en-
gage in a fistic encounter" clearly has the usual meaning of
"engaging in a fist-fight" and that the limitation "in such
manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public"
also has a sufficiently definite meaning. That the line be-
tween criminal and non-criminal conduct will sometimes de-
pend upon a series of circumstances which will call for court
and jury determination did not upset the Chief Justice, who
repeated an often quoted admonition of the United States
Supreme Court:
That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult
to determine the side of the line on which a particular
fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the lan-
guage too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. 9
The court did not agree with the contention that the
sweep of the statute is so broad as to invade the area of
protected freedoms, concluding that "contrary to the defen-
dant's assertion, we find the statute to be narrowly drawn."'1
It is submitted that dissenting Justice Barham's expressed
fear that the statute is in direct contravention to what he
considers to be "a person's constitutional right to defend him-
self' is without substantial foundation. The general disturb-
ing the peace prohibition must, as a matter of statutory and
constitutional interpretation, give way to the defendant's
constitutional and specific statutory rights of self defense. 1 2
Nowhere is the dilemma of drafting constitutionally
sound statutes more evident than in the highly technical and
detailed area of narcotics regulation and prohibition. State v.
Martin,13 a controlled dangerous substances law decision,
held that the word "deliver" in the statute's definition of
distribution of controlled dangerous substances 14 does not
have such a variety of meanings as to render the statute
invalid. Chief Justice Sanders stated:
The word must be taken in its usual sense, in connection
with the context. In context, it has a commonly under-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 334, citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946).
10. 307 So. 2d at 334.
11. Id. at 335.
12. LA. R.S. 14:19-22 (1950).
13. 310 So. 2d 545 (La. 1975).
14. LA. R.S. 40:961(15) (Supp. 1972).
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stood meaning .... It means to transfer possession or
control. 15
In State v. Slayton' s6 the Louisiana Supreme Court re-
jected another hypertechnical attack upon the controlled
dangerous substances law.17 Defense counsel had urged that
the clause covering methamphetamines was vague, indefinite
and overly broad because of the phrase "including its . . .
isomers,"' 8 since some isomers were not harmful and were
included in the manufacture of compounds so benign in
character as to be sold commercially without a prescription.
The court looked to the statute as a whole, reasoning that the
provision in question is only intended to apply to those iso-
mers which have a stimulating effect upon the nervous sys-
tem and are "subject to abuse."'19 As thus limited to po-
tentially harmful isomers, the statute provides clear and
adequate warning as to the particular conduct made criminal
and is not overly broad in its application. In support of the
holding Justice Marcus reiterated the court's previous test
that:
The requirement of definiteness need only give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his conduct is
criminal. To accomplish this the legislature may employ
generic terms. Cumbersome enumeration or explicit de-
lineation of all possible situations is not required. "The
enumeration in a statute of every item or variation in
conduct is frequently impossible.
'20
Despite a generally practical and liberal approach as to
the sufficiency of statutory definitions of crime, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has refused to tailor overly broad statutory
language to constitutional proportions by judicial limitation.
Thus, in City of Baton Rouge v. Ewing2' the supreme court
affirmed a trial court ruling that a city ordinance punishing
the use of "indecent, vile, profane or blasphemous language"
in public places is unconstitutional. In rejecting the city's
15. 310 So. 2d at 546.
16. 301 So. 2d 600 (La. 1974); accord, State v. Franklin, 309 So. 2d 128 (La.
1975).
17. LA. R.S. 40:961-84 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 634 § 1.
18. LA. R.S. 40:964, Schedule III A(2) (Supp. 1972).
19. 301 So. 2d at 603.
20. Id. at 602, citing Baton Rouge v. Norman, 290 So. 2d 865 (La. 1974).
21. 308 So. 2d 776 (La. 1975).
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argument that the court should interpret the statute as only
punishing the use of "fighting words," Justice Tate pointed
out that the court should not "perform judicial surgery and
judicial transplant to save an overbroad disturbing the peace
statute.... [Tihe restructuring of the statute addresses itself
to the legislature." Unlike Slayton, the court in Ewing was
unable to interpret the phrase at issue in limiting terms of
the manifest purpose of the statutory provision, reading it as
a whole.
SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Causing Death of Viable Unborn Fetus
In State v. Gyles2 the defendant brutally attacked a
woman who was eight months pregnant, causing the miscar-
riage and stillbirth of a previously viable fetus. In holding
that the defendant's conduct was not punishable as second
degree murder, the Louisiana Supreme Court stressed the
fact that Louisiana's murder articles originated as a general
codification of the common law crime of murder and should be
construed accordingly. Thus, Justice Barham stated:
The common law crime of murder, which proscribes the
killing of a "human being," contemplates only the killing
of those human beings who have been born alive and who
thus have an existence independent of their mothers at
the time of their death.2 '
Significantly, the general homicide definition of article 29 of
the Criminal Code continued the common law requirement of
the "killing of a human being. ' 25
The common law "born alive" formula was easily applied
in Gyles where, although there was a viable fetus, the process
of childbirth had not yet begun at the time of the defendant's
attack on the expectant mother. A more difficult situation
was presented in a New York case2 in which a defendant who
22. Id. at 779, citing State v. Harrison, 280 So. 2d 215 (1973).
23. 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975).
24. Id. at 800-01 (citations omitted).
25. LA. R.S. 14:29 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 110, § 1. The
same language is repeated in the second degree murder definition which was
construed in Gyles, 313 So. 2d at 800. See LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1973).
26. People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 28 (1949).
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had fathered the child of his fourteen year old daughter
strangled the baby with its umbilical cord. Medical experts
testified they were reasonably certain that the baby had been
born alive at the time of the defendant's act. The court re-
versed the murder conviction on the ground that since there
had been no testimony by an eyewitness to live birth, proof by
the medical experts' testimony was insufficient. Of course,
even the testimony of participants, when they can and will
testify, can be conflicting and confusing as to how far the
birth process had progressed at the time of the destruction or
killing. People v. Chavez27 answers this dilemma. In that case
the California court held that killing a viable fetus in the
process of being born was murder. Later, in Keeler v. Superior
Court28 the California Supreme Court reiterated the Chavez
holding:
Chavez thus stands for the proposition-to which we
adhere-that a viable fetus "in the process of being born"
is a human being within the meaning of the homicide
statutes. But it stands for no more; in particular it does
not hold that a fetus, however viable, which is not "in the
process of being born" is nevertheless a "human being" in
the law of homicide. 2
9
Significantly, Justice Barham cites Keeler and Chavez in
his comprehensive listing of the common law authorities
which Louisiana should follow in construing the term "hu-
man being" in its murder articles. Adoption of the Chavez
formula would have provided a workable rule in those cases
in which the exact stage of the childbirth process at the time
of the defendant's killing of the baby or fetus is difficult to
ascertain. The new crime of "Killing a child during deliv-
ery,"' 30 enacted in 1973 as one of the proposed statutes in a
27. 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
28. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970).
29. Id. at 637, 470 P.2d at 629.
30. LA. R.S. 14:87.1 (Supp. 1973): "Killing a child during delivery is the
intentional destruction, during parturition of the mother, of the vitality or
life of a child in a state of being born and before actual birth, which child
would otherwise have been born alive; provided, however, that the crime of
killing a child during delivery shall not be construed to include any case in
which the death of a child results from the use by a physician of a procedure
during delivery which is necessary to save the life of the child or of the
mother and is used for the express purpose of and with the specific intent of
saving the life of the child or of the mother. Whoever commits the crime of
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package of abortion-related bills,3 1 generally follows the
Chavez rule, providing life imprisonment for destruction of a
viable fetus "in a state of being born and before actual
birth."32
ATTEMPTED SIMPLE RAPE; ATTEMPT TO FORCIBLY RAPE
In State v. Miller3 3 the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
simple rape as a responsive verdict to a charge of aggravated
rape, where the state alleged that the victim's resistance was
prevented by force and threats of great bodily harm. In Miller
the court recognized that if a jury could not return a capital
verdict of aggravated rape on such a charge, it could still
justifiably conclude that the defendant's force and violence
had resulted in a sufficient hysteria from fear that the victim
was rendered incapable of resisting by reason of a stupor or
abnormal condition of mind. Under the broad language of the
simple rape article, abnormal condition of mind could be
"from any cause. ' 3 4
A broad construction of the simple rape article was
applied again in 1975 in State v. Beard,3 5 in which the court
held that evidence of the defendant's use of physical violence
and of the victim's resulting fear supported a verdict of at-
tempted simple rape, responsive to a charge of attempted
aggravated rape. In so holding, Justice Calogero stressed the
Miller rationale that fear or hysteria resulting from the at-
tack of a would-be rapist came within the "abnormal condi-
tion of mind from any cause" clause of the simple rape article.
The Miller-Beard interpretation of the simple rape article
provides a logical device whereby a jury, unable to convict of
the capital crime of aggravated rape, may return a guilty
verdict for simple rape. The rationale of the verdict would be
that the female victim's normal resistance had been pre-
killing a child during delivery shall be imprisoned at hard labor in the
penitentiary for life."
31. For a discussion of other 1973 abortion-related statutes, see Abortion
Regulation: Louisiana's Abortive Attempt, 34 LA. L. REV. 676 (1974).
32. LA. R.S. 14:87.1 (Supp. 1973).
33. 237 La. 266, 11 So. 2d' 108 (1959); discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term-Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, 20 LA. L. REV. 315, 327 (1960); Note, 20 LA. L. REV. 600, 604 (1960).
34. LA. R.S. 14:43(1) (1950).
35. 312 So. 2d 278 (La. 1975).
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vented by hysteria and fear resulting from the defendant's
brutal attack.
A 1975 "forcible rape" statute authorizes a similar com-
promise verdict or charge. Under the statute,
[florcible rape is sexual intercourse without the lawful
consent of the female where she is prevented from resist-
ing the act by force or threats of physical violence
wherein the victim reasonably believes her resistance to be
useless.36
Correspondingly, the responsive verdict article of the Code of
Criminal Procedure has been amended to provide that forc-
ible rape and attempted forcible rape are also responsive to a
charge of aggravated rape.37 The guidelines for jury determi-
nation of the line between capital and non-capital criminal
liability are found in the statutory definitions of "aggravated
rape" and "forcible rape." Under article 42 of the Criminal
Code, aggravated rape requires either resistance of force "to
the utmost," or the prevention of resistance "by threats of
great and immediate bodily harm." Article 43.1 adds forcible
rape, which only requires that resistance be prevented "by
force or threats of physical violence wherein the victim
reasonably believes her resistance to be useless" (emphasis
added).. These definitions separate the rapist who accom-
plishes his purpose with a brutal attack from the one whose
victim submits to powerful but less brutal attacks or threats.
The new forcible rape crime will cover cases in which an
aggravated rape charge would be neither appropriate nor
successfully prosecuted.
ARMED ROBBERY
Armed robbery is robbery committed while armed with a
"dangerous weapon." 38 "Dangerous weapon" is defined as an
"instrumentality, which in the manner used, is calculated or
likely to produce death or great bodily harm. 3 9 In State v.
Levi 40 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an unloaded
36. La. Acts 1975, No. 333, enacting new LA. R.S. 14:43.1 (emphasis
added).
37. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 815, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 334.
38. LA. R.S. 14:64 (1950).
39. Id. 14:2(3) (1950).
40. 259 La. 591, 250 So. 2d 751 (1971). For conflicting views as to the
soundness of the court's holding, see Note, 32 LA. L. REV. 158 (1971), and The
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and inoperative gun presented by a robber could be a
"dangerous weapon." It is enough that the gun is used to put
the victim in reasonable fear of being shot with it. Hence, an
unloaded or inoperative gun or even a toy gun employed to
substantiate a threat of shooting by the robber could consti-
tute a dangerous weapon.
State v. Leak41 clearly came within the Levi guidelines. In
Leak the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant's
use of an extension of a rachet coupled with a socket to
simulate a firearm convincingly to those at the robbery
satisfied the "dangerous weapon" requirement of armed rob-
bery. As a make-weight, Justice Marcus stated, "Additionally,
as in Levi, the instrument used here was capable of conver-
sion into a bludgeon." 42 The weapon's appearance as a fire-
arm, however, appears to have been the principal ground for
its classification as a dangerous weapon.
State v. Elam4 3 raised the possibility that the Levi
rationale might be extended even further. According to Jus-
tice Barham,
the victim of the crime testified that during the course of
the robbery the perpetrator repeatedly told him, "Don't
make me shoot you" and "I'm going to shoot you, boy."
The victim further testified that the perpetrator kept one
hand inside his jacket pocket at all times during the
course of the robbery and motioned with the hand in his
pocket in a way which indicated that he had a weapon in
his pocket. We consider this testimony some evidence from
which the jury might infer that the perpetrator was
armed with a dangerous weapon."
The statement would appear overly broad but for his footnote
admonition that "[t]his holding does not make any extension
of Levi nor do we hold that a 'hand in the pocket' is a danger-
ous weapon. '4 5 The limitation is supported by the supreme
court's prior holding in Calvin that the word "instrumental-
ity" in the definition of dangerous weapon requires some
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Criminal
Law, 32 LA. L. REV. 298 (1972).
41. 306 So. 2d 737 (La. 1975).
42. Id. at 739.
43. 312 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975).
44. Id. at 322.
45. Id.
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inanimate instrumentality. 46 Thus, portions of the human
anatomy, such as teeth, a fist or the "hand in the pocket"
cannot be treated as dangerous weapons. Even assuming
the soundness of the Levi and Leak decisions, some difficulty
exists in extending the subjective view of the victim approach
to a "hand in the pocket" situation.
In State v. Refuge 47 the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted
logical and practical constructions of key phrases in the
armed robbery definition. In Refuge the alleged victim was
partially financing one of the active participants in a gam-
bling game. The defendant held up the game and seized the
"pot" in the middle of the table. In holding immaterial the
fact that the victim was not in actual control of the money
taken, Justice Barham concluded "[t]aking property from 'the
person' of another has repeatedly been broadened in scope to
include takingfrom his presence."4 He was also unconcerned
as to whether the precise nature of the victim's interest in
the money taken had been determined:
[T]he felonious taking, more than the perfect title of the
alleged owner, forms the essence of the jury question in
cases of robbery .... The extent of any of the players'
interests in the money in the "pot" at the time when play
was interrupted by the robbery is undetermined, but an
ownership interest of an undetermined value is no less an
ownership interest. Of that interest Aubrey Harris was
robbed. 49
The realistic and practical approach to the Refuge robbery
case makes for the sort of non-technical application of the
robbery articles which was sought by broad definition em-
ployed in the Criminal Code of 1942.
CONCEALED WEAPONS
The issue in State v. Fluker50 was whether a partially
visible weapon is a "concealed" weapon under the Illegal
46. State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 24 So. 2d 467 (1945), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-46 Term-Criminal Law, 7 LA. L.
REV. 288 (1947).
47. 300 So. 2d 489 (La. 1974).
48. Id. at 491 (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. 311 So. 2d 863 (La. 1975).
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Carrying of Weapons article of the Criminal Code.5 ' The de-
fendant had been stopped as a result of his "driving in an
erratic manner." 52 A police officer noticed that he was carry-
ing a small pistol in a brown holster attached to his belt on
his right hip. Defendant wore no jacket or coat that concealed
the holster and gun from view, and enough of the gun pro-
truded from the holster to be recognized as a pistol. Relying on
prior jurisprudence that a partially concealed pistol is a "con-
cealed" weapon within the meaning of the law, the trial judge
found the defendant guilty as charged. 53 In reversing, the
supreme court stressed the more demanding language of "in-
tentional concealment" in the concealed weapon offense of
the 1942 Criminal Code. 54 Actually, the word "intentional" in
the concealed weapons definition does not require a specific
intent or active desire to conceal the weapon. Under article
11, the term "intentional" has reference to "general criminal
intent." Thus the mens rea requirement of the 1942 Criminal
Code offense is very similar to the pre-code requirement.
However, Justice Marcus is fully justified in concluding that
the definition of article 95(A)(1) provides a "realistic proscrip-
tion that contemplates that a weapon, although not in 'full
open view,' is nonetheless not a 'concealed' weapon if it is
sufficiently exposed to reveal its identity. 5 5 The common
sense approach to the concealed weapons definition is sup-
ported by a normal construction of the simple terms employed
in the statute. In Black's Law Dictionary the term "conceal"
is defined as "to hide; secrete; withhold from the knowledge of
others; to withhold from observation; . . . to cover or keep
from sight." The definition is not met in a case like Fluker,
where the presence of the pistol on defendant's person would
be obvious to any observer. The situation would have been
quite different if the pistol had been entirely hidden under
defendant's coat in a shoulder holster.
ENTRAPMENT
Distinguishing between detection and instigation in con-
nection with alleged entrapment defenses is often difficult.
51. LA. R.S. 14:95 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 345 § 1; La.
Acts 1958, No. 21 § 1; La. Acts 1958, No. 379 §§ 1, 3; La. Acts 1968, No. 647 § 1.
52. 311 So. 2d at 864.
53. Id. at 865, relying on State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259 (1885).
54. See statute citations in note 51, supra.
55. 311 So. 2d at 866.
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For example, the entrapment defense will not lie if officers or
agents merely furnish an opportunity and encourage action
by a defendant already predisposed to crime; but police cross
the line of proper conduct when they induce a suspect charac-
ter to engage in criminal conduct he did not previously con-
template. The question is largely where the basic criminal
purpose really originated. Following an earlier, well-reasoned
opinion in State v. Kelly, 56 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that an entrapment defense had been properly rejected in
State v. Bates.57 In Bates the undercover agent had posed as a
fellow student and had affirmatively sought marijuana. Jus-
tice Tate's decision stressed the fact that
[i]n rejecting the fairly strong testimony that the under-
cover agent induced the crime, the trial jury apparently
determined that the defendant had the necessary intent
to commit the crime even before the agent afforded him
an opportunity to do so, and that the agent nierely af-
forded the defendant an opportunity to commit the of-
fense rather than induced it.58
Federal courts also recognize the general "predisposi-
tion" versus "inducement" test,59 holding that "[d]ecoys are
permissible to entrap criminals, but not to create them ... "So
Usually, as in Bates, entrapment is a factual question for the
jury, after proper instructions along the lines indicated
above. A study of the facts recited in the Bates opinion indi-
cates that when evidence points to a predisposition toward
the commission of a particular crime, law enforcement agents
have, and should have, a free hand to actively induce a pros-
ecutable instance of criminal conduct.
56. 263 La. 545, 268 So. 2d 650 (1972).
57. 301 So. 2d 619 (La. 1974).
58. Id. at 621.
59. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
60. United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349 (1913).
[Vol. 36
